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Abstract  
 This study examines the effect of audit committee tenure on financial 
reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study uses 
panel data obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange factbooks and the 
financial statements of 14 listed deposit money banks over a period of 10 years 
(2007-2016). The study uses cross sectional and time series research design. 
Financial reporting quality was measured using the modified Jones (1991) 
model and changes in working capital model, while audit committee tenure 
was measured as the mean tenure of audit committee members. The data was 
analyzed using descriptive (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) and inferential statistics (correlation and regression analysis). The 
study reveals that audit committee tenure has a negative and insignificant 
effect on financial reporting quality under the two models. The implication of 
these results is that the tenure of audit committee members is not important 
when considering the financial reporting quality of deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. The study therefore concludes that the effect of audit committee 
tenure on financial reporting quality of deposit money banks in Nigeria is 
negative and insignificant. Based on this conclusion, the study recommends 
that further research should be conducted on other audit committee attributes 
in order to see which of the attributes may have significant effect on financial 
reporting quality.  
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Introduction  
 The objective of financial reporting is to provide high quality financial 
information about economic entities that is useful for economic decisions. 
According to International Accounting Standard Board (IASB, 2008), high 
quality financial reporting is critical to investors and other stakeholders in 
making investment, credit and similar decision. An important variable of 
financial reporting that is usually used as a yardstick of financial reporting 
quality is accounting earnings, (Okoh, 2012; Yahaya, Kutigi & Ahmed, 2015) 
as it is reported in the published financial report of firms is expected to provide 
a timely and reliable input to potential investors, shareholders, creditors, 
employees, management, financial analysts, regulators and other stakeholders 
for efficient economic decisions.  
 The issue of financial reporting quality is of tremendous concern not 
only for the final users, but the entire economy as it affects economic decisions 
which may have significant impact. However, managerial opportunistic 
behaviours as well as unethical accounting practices are identified as major 
challenge to the quality of accounting earnings and financial reporting quality 
(Shen & Hsiang-Lin, 2007). According to their study of some accounting 
scandals and collapse of some corporate entities (Enron, Worldcom, Xerox 
and Parmalat), earnings manipulation and artificial transaction are responsible 
for the scandal and the collapse of those entities. Moreover, most of the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) and Managers of the collapsed entities are found 
involved in earnings management through structuring and artificial 
transactions with related parties which affected earnings and financial 
reporting adversely (Shen & Hsiang-lin, 2007). Earnings management as a 
prime factor that impairs quality of earnings is regarded as unethical and 
includes using managerial judgments and dearth in regulation (Bello, 2010). 
In a study of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financial 
reporting quality, Shehu (2012) opines that financial reporting quality could 
be achieved by full disclosure and higher level of transparency; and regarded 
corporate transparency as the widespread availability of relevant and reliable 
information about the periodic performance that is free from errors and 
misstatements. Therefore, the financial reporting quality is to promote 
transparency and deliver high quality Annual Report through comprehensive 
disclosure. 
 The audit committee tenure has become the focus of several debates. 
The resulting dilemma is that the firm is faced with the decision of whether to 
replace its audit committee members after a short period of time or to build 
and maintain a long-term tenure. The outcomes are quite conflicting. While 
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some researchers have identified negative relationship between auditor 
committee tenure and financial reporting quality (Page & Spira, 2005; Vafeas, 
2005) others argue on positive relationship between audit committee tenure 
and financial reporting quality (Adeyemi, 2006; Chan, Liu & Sun, 2012; 
Vafeas, 2005). In recent years, auditors have been blamed for their role in 
notable corporate scandals in Nigeria (Cadbury Nigeria Plc, Intercontinental 
Bank Plc, African Petroleum Plc, Afribank Plc). The criticism had raised lots 
of questions regarding whether financial reporting quality can be influenced 
by audit committee tenure in an organization.  
 Similarly, Nigerian governance regulation of the Combined Code 
(2008) states “length of service beyond six years for a Non-Executive Director 
should be subject to particularly rigorous review and should take into account 
the need for progressive refreshing of the Board. Non-executive directors may 
serve longer than nine years (e.g. three-year terms), subject to annual re-
election. Serving more than nine years could be relevant to the determination 
of a non-executive director’s independence”. This is much more important and 
could be of greater concern for those non-executive directors who serve on the 
audit committee. Therefore, ongoing interest in the issue suggests a new 
paradigm for this study that has not been completely answered by extant 
research.  
 Several studies (Healey & Kim, 2003; Mgbame, Eragbha & Osazuwa, 
2012; Shehu, 2011) have attempted to analyze some explanatory variables for 
the state of financial reporting quality. In view of these studies, audit 
committee tenure has become the focus of much debate. Should a firm replace 
its audit committee member on a regular basis, or should the audit tenure be 
allowed to be a long-term basis or short term basis served in audit committee? 
Studies on the effect of audit committee tenure on financial reporting quality 
are at divergent.  The search for mechanisms to ensure reliable, high quality 
financial reporting has largely focused on the structure of audit committees’ 
composition. The spate of audit failure in the world, especially in Nigeria, has 
brought great disappointment to the users of financial reports. The bane of the 
problem has been linked to whether a long term, short term, three or nine year 
tenure of audit committee members (combined code, 2008) adoption could 
have a significant impact is still under contention by the scholars. In Nigeria, 
audit setting, the challenge of audit committee tenure has not attracted much 
empirical studies beyond mere anecdotal opinions (Mgbame, Ezagbhe & 
Osazuwa, 2012). Thus, this study examines whether audit committee tenure 
impact on financial reporting quality of listed DMBs in Nigeria.  
 In view of the research problem, the study examines the effect of audit 
committee tenure on financial reporting quality of DMBs in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the objective of the study is to find out the effect of audit committee 
tenure on financial reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria 
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for a period of ten years (2007-2016). Furthermore, the study test the following 
research hypothesis in view of research objective attributed to the study. 
 Audit committee tenure has no significant effect on financial reporting 
quality of  listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
 The study is useful to a number of stakeholders in banking business 
environment such as managers, investors, customers and policy makers of 
listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study is also useful as part of a 
priori expectation that it contribute to literature, methodology, 
conceptualization and empirical as relates to the effect of audit committee 
tenure on the financial reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. The remaining part of the study covers the literature, methodology, 
results and discussions, conclusion and recommendations.  
 
Literature Review 
 This section presents the conceptual framework, empirical review and 
theoretical literature on the effect of audit committee tenure on financial 
reporting quality. The earliest evidence of the use of audit committees was in 
the United States in the late 1930s when the New York Stock Exchange 
advised corporations to set up audit committees (Armitage & Bradley, 1994). 
By 1978, the establishment of audit committees had become mandatory for all 
companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange (Williams, 1977). 
According to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, an audit committee refers to:  A 
committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of 
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and 
financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial 
statements of the issuer; and if no such committee exists with respect to an 
issuer, the entire board of directors of the issuer.  
 Ayinde (2002) opines that the audit committee is a standing committee 
established to enhance corporate accountability by working with the internal 
auditors and management to improve and strengthen the financial reporting 
practices of an entity and ensure proper conduct of corporate affairs in 
accordance with generally accepted ethical and legal standards. Leong, Wang, 
Suward and Kusnadi (2015) define audit committee tenure as the tenure of 
audit committee directors on the board is another important factor in 
determining the effectiveness of audit committees in performing their 
monitoring role. The tenure refers to the length of time the audit committee 
member has served on the board. There are several views on the impact of 
tenure length of audit committee members on their ability to fulfill their duties 
competently and effectively. 
 The theory of inspired confidence underpins the study because it offers 
a linkage between the users’ requirement for credible financial reports and the 
capacity of the audit processes to meet those needs. Developed by the Limperg 
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Institute in Netherlands in 1985, the theory of inspired confidence posits that 
the auditor, as a confidential agent, derives his broad function from the need 
for expert and independent assessment plus the need for an expert and 
independent judgement supported by evidence. Minimizing the risk of 
undetected material misstatements implies that the auditor is under a duty to 
conduct his work in a manner that does not betray the confidence which he 
commands before the rational person even if the auditor may not produce what 
is greater than the expectation of the public. The import of the theory of 
inspired confidence is that the duties of the auditors derive from the confidence 
that are bestowed by the public on the success of the audit process and the 
assurance which the opinion of the accountant conveys. Since this confidence 
determines the existence of the process, a betrayal of the confidence logically 
means a termination of the process or function. Carmichael (2004) discusses 
the social significance of the audit and asserted that when the confidence that 
society has in the effectiveness of the audit process and the audit report is 
misplaced, the value relevance of that audit is destroyed. Audit provides 
assurance to the owners, management, investors and stakeholders of a 
company as well as provides confidence in financial reporting, corporate 
governance and the capital markets.    
 Empirically, a number of studies have examined the effect of audit 
committee tenure on the financial reporting quality of listed deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. Therefore, Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2001) examine the 
impact of auditor committee tenure on financial reporting quality. The result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the auditor compromises his 
independence most often in a long term auditor contract and suggests that after 
all auditor tenure may have significant effect on the audit quality. 
 Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) posit that the effect of audit 
committee tenure on the credibility of financial statements can be seen from 
two views; regulators and economic view. In the point of regulatory view, long 
association between a client and an audit firm may lead to impair their 
independence. For example, in the United States, the Metcalf Committee 
report argues that long association between a corporation and an accounting 
firm may lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the 
interests of its client’s management that truly independent action by the 
accounting firm becomes difficult. Therefore, the report suggest a mandatory 
auditor rotation as a way for the accounting profession to bolster their 
independence from clients.  
 Myers, Myers and Omer (2003) find that auditor committee tenure 
reduces abnormal accruals whether positive or negative. Taken as a whole, 
these US studies run counter to the assumption that the quality of audit 
deteriorates as the length of auditor-client relationships increases. In France, 
auditors are chosen for six financial years. As a result, their mandate (and to 
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some extent their tenure) enjoys a strong legal protection, initially enforced to 
limit opinion-shopping opportunities. However, this legal protection may have 
adverse effects. If this is so, the capacity of the auditor to resist managerial 
pressure is likely to deteriorate over time. In Nigeria, it is professionally 
required that audit tenure should not exceed three years but this does not 
appear to be enforced. 
 Page and Spira (2005) examine the tenure of audit committee directors 
on the board is another important factor in determining the effectiveness of 
audit committees in performing their monitoring role. The tenure refers to the 
length of time the audit committee member has served on the board. There are 
several views on the impact of tenure length of audit committee members on 
their ability to fulfill their duties competently and effectively. A view taken in 
earlier empirical studies (Page & Spira, 2005) was that longer board service 
allows directors to gain more firm specific knowledge and better equip 
themselves to deal with complicated committee proceedings, hence resulting 
in improved performance in protecting shareholder’s interests.  
 Vafeas (2005) argues that longer board service might compromise 
audit committee directors’ independence by bringing directors and 
management closer resulting in directors ‘befriending’ management. Vafeas 
(2005) documents a positive association between the mean tenure of audit 
committee members and poor earning quality measure, showing an inverse 
relationship between the average tenure and earnings quality. Boone, Khurana 
and Raman (2008) find some evidence for a non-linear relationship between 
auditor committee tenure of Big 5 audits and financial reporting credibility by 
using the ex-ante equity risk premium. Their results show that the equity risk 
premium decreases in the early years of an auditor-client relationship and 
increases with each additional year past 13 years of auditor tenure. Ghosh and 
Moon (2005) analyze the perception of investors, rating agencies and financial 
analysts of auditor tenure by using earnings response coefficient as proxy for 
the perceived financial reporting credibility (perceived earnings quality). 
Their results show that investors and information intermediaries perceive 
auditor tenure as improving financial reporting credibility. In more detail, 
investors pay a premium of two percent for earnings as auditor committee 
tenure increases by an additional year. The influence of earnings for stock 
rankings becomes more important with extended auditor tenure (stock 
rankings improve by 8.2 percent by an additional year of auditor tenure) and 
financial analysts attach greater importance to the reported earnings in forming 
their expectations about future earnings with increasing auditor tenure.  
 Furthermore, an experimental study by Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) 
analyzes the impact of a five-year audit firm rotation compared to an already 
existing audit partner rotation on non- professional investors’ perceptions of 
audit quality. The participants are requested to rate of how much of an income 
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reducing audit difference will be recorded by the client. They find no 
significant difference. Under both auditor rotation conditions, investors 
believe that most of the audit difference will be corrected.  
 Dart (2009) finds differences in the level of concerns about auditor 
committee tenure between institutional and private investors in the U.K. 
Approximately 50 percent of the private investors would support the idea of a 
mandatory auditor rotation to strengthen auditor independence whereas the 
overwhelming majority of institutional investors disapprove an auditor 
rotation rule due to higher audit costs. Concerns about a long auditor tenure 
are greater if accounting skills are lower. 
 Oosterbosch (2009) investigates the effects of IFRS implementation 
on earnings management by banks though. Using a sample of listed and 
unlisted European banks and a single-stage regression that models the non-
discretionary part of FRQ2s and tests for income smoothing, this thesis 
examines first whether the level of earnings management by banks through 
loan loss provisioning has decreased since the adoption of IFRS. And second, 
whether loan loss disclosure requirements are negatively related to banks’ 
income smoothing practices. Results show that the level of earnings 
management has indeed decreased since IFRS adoption, but evidence suggests 
that detailed disclosure requirements regarding loan loss accounting do not 
deter bank managers from using FRQ2 to their discretion for income 
smoothing (this result is not significant). 
 Ebimobowei and Oyadonghan (2011) posit that policy favoring 
mandatory rotation of auditors could have positive effects on the quality of 
audit reports as it would allow for fresh approach and restore public 
confidence in the audit function. Adeyemi and Okpala (2011) notes that an 
audit firm’s tenure can result in a loss of auditor’s independence. A long audit-
client relationship could lead to an alignment of the auditors’ interest and that 
of its client which makes truly independent behaviour of the auditor a 
probability. 
 Finally, Okolie (2014) examines the relationship and effects of auditor 
tenure and auditor independence on the earnings management (measured by 
the amount of discretionary accruals) of companies in Nigeria. The study relies 
on secondary data derived from various companies’ financial statements and 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange fact book to determine and measure the level of 
earnings manipulations in corporate financial statements, applying an all-
inclusive multivariate analysis. The empirical analysis using a total of 342 
company year observations, shows that Audit tenure and auditor independence 
exert significant effects and exhibit significant relationship with the amount of 
discretionary accruals of quoted companies in Nigeria. The study failed to 
show the effect of tenure against earnings management. 
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Methodology 
 This study adopts correlational research design to investigate the 
relationships as well as the effect of the audit committee tenure on the financial 
reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The data used in 
this study are acquired from the Nigeria Stock Exchange and annual of all the 
fourteen (14) listed deposit money banks under study for a period of ten years 
(2007 to 2016). In line with the research paradigm underpinning this study and 
consistent with the objectives of this study, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
model was employed as follows:  
FRQ1it = β0 + β1ACTEit + β2LEVGit + β3RISKit + β4SIZEit + β5PROit + eit 
…………. 1 
FRQ2it = β0 + β1ACTEit + β2LEVGit + β3RISKit + β4SIZEit + β5PROit + eit 
……………. 2 
Whereas: 
β0 = is the intercept  
β1 – β5 = are the parameters to be estimated in the equation 
FRQ1 = Financial reporting quality, measured using the absolute value of 
residuals in discretionary accrual model based on modified Jones (1991) as 
used by Dechow & Dichev (2002) and Yahaya, Kutigi & Ahmed (2015). 
FRQ2 = Financial reporting quality, measured using loan loss provision as 
used by Oosterbosch (2009) and Chang et al (2006). 
ACTE = Audit committee tenure is measured by the mean tenure of audit 
committee members (Leong, et al, 2015). 
LEVG = Leverage is measured as the ratio of debt to equity (Yahaya, Kutigi 
& Ahmed, 2015). 
RISK = Risk is measured as non-performing loan divided total loan (Bell, 
Peecher & Solomon, 2002). 
SIZE = Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of total asset (Bhushan, 
1999; Shehu, 2011). 
ROA = Return on total asset is measured as earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total asset (Shehu, 2011). 
i = Firm subscript (in this case 14) 
t = Time subscript (in this case 10 years) 
e = Stochastic error term 
 
Results and Discussion 
 This section presents the analysis of data using STATA 13 as well as 
the interpretation and discussion of findings. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FRQ1 140 0.352 0.332 0.01 0.91 
FRQ2 140 -.0075 0.028 -.192 0.136 
ACTE 140 0.499 0.025 0.333 0.6 
LEVG 140 0.175 0.127 0.01 0.37 
RISK 140 0.045 0.065 0.001 0.458 
SIZE 140 8.946 0.374 8.109 9.676 
PRO 140 1.057 3.872 -29.64 9.54 
Source: STATA 13 Outputs 
 
 As shown in the table above for all the 140 observation the average of 
FRQ1 is 0.352 with a minimum value of 0.01, maximum 0.91 with a standard 
deviation of 0.332. This shows that on the average, the listed deposit money 
banks had a positive FRQ1 the majority of the banks are in the right 
distribution of FRQ1. Similarly the FRQ2 with a mean value of -.0075, 
minimum of -.193 and maximum of 0.136 with a standard deviation of 0.028. 
Also the average of ACTE is 0.499 with a minimum value of 0.333, maximum 
value of 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.025. This shows that on the average, 
the listed deposit money banks had a negative ACTE the majority of the banks 
are not in the right distribution of ACTE.  
 Furthermore, LEVG average statistic value is 0.175 with a minimum 
value of 0.01, maximum value of 0.37 and a standard deviation of 0.127. This 
shows that though on the average, the listed deposit money banks had a 
positive LEVG, the majority of the banks are to the right distribution of LEVG. 
Also, RISK average statistics is 0.045 with a minimum value of 0.001, 
maximum value of 0.458 with a standard deviation of 0.374. This shows that 
on the average, the listed deposit money banks had a positive RISK the 
majority of the banks are in the right distribution of RISK. 
 Meanwhile, SIZE average statistics is 8.94, with a minimum value of 
8.946, maximum value of 9.676 with a standard deviation of 0.065. This shows 
that on the average, the listed deposit money banks had a positive SIZE the 
majority of the banks are in the right distribution of RISK. Finally, PRO 
average statistics is 1.057, with a minimum value of -29.64, maximum value 
of 9.54 with a standard deviation of 3.872. This shows that on the average, the 
listed deposit money banks had a positive PRO, the majority of the banks are 
in the right distribution of PRO. 
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Table 2  Correlation Analysis 
VARIABLES FRQ1 FRQ2 ACTE LEVG RISK SIZE PRO 
FRQ1 1.0000       
FRQ2 
-0.0781 
0.3589 
1.0000 
     
ACTE 
-0.1841*  
0.0294      
-0.0856 
0.3146 
1.0000 
    
LEVG 
0.9294* 
0.0000     
-0.0640 
0.4526 
0.1088 
0.2006 
1.0000 
   
RISK 
0.3523* 
0.0000       
-0.1270 
0.1349 
0.0146 
0.8636 
0.3326* 
0.0001 
1.0000 
  
SIZE 
-0.2769* 
0.0009   
-0.1775* 
0.0359 
0.1683* 
0.0469 
0.1683* 
0.0058 
-0.3590* 
0.0000 
1.0000 
 
PRO 
-0.1770* 
-0.0364         
0.5299* 
0.0000 
0.0189 
0.8249 
0.1762* 
0.0373 
-0.2659* 
0.0015 
0.2028* 
0.0162 
1.0000 
Source: STATA 13 Outputs 
 
 As shown in table 2 the correlation coefficients were calculated to 
ascertain the pairwise association between the dependent variables and 
explanatory and identify both the direction and quantum of the relationship. It 
should be noted that correlation greater than 0.80 indicate multicollinearity 
problem. In table 2, result shows a correlation coefficient of 0.0855 between 
FRQ1 and ACTE; -0.1841* between FRQ2 and ACTE; -0.0856 between 
LEVG and FRQ1; -0.0640 between LEVG and FRQ2; 0.1088 between LEVG 
and ACTE. In the three cases the result suggest good relation except LEVG 
and FRQ2 that is negative. Also RISK and FRQ1 shows 0.3523*; RISK and 
FRQ2 shows -0.127; RISK and ACTE shows 0.0146; RISK and LEVG shows 
0.3326*. In the four cases the result suggest good relationship except RISK 
and ACTE with negative relationship. Similarly, SIZE and FRQ1 shows -
0.2769*; SIZE and FRQ2 shows -0.1775*; SIZE and ACTE shows 0.1683*; 
SIZE and LEVG shows 0.1683*; SIZE and RISK shows -0.3590*; SIZE and 
SIZE shows 0.2028*. In the five cases the result suggest good correlation. Also 
PRO and FRQ1 shows -0.1770*; PRO and FRQ2 shows 0.5299*; PRO and 
ACTE shows 0.0189; PRO and LEVG shows 0.1762*; PRO and RISK shows 
-0.2659*; PRO and SIZE shows 0.2028*. In the six cases the result suggests 
good correlation. Table 2 also shows that there is no presence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables since none of the 
correlation coefficients is equal to 0.80. 
Table 3  
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data 
Variables OBS W V Z Pro>Z 
FRQ1 140 0.86294               15.034 6.122 0.00000 
FRQ2 140 0.72011               30.700 7.735 0.00000 
ACTE 140 0.94340               6.208 4.124 0.00002 
LEVG 140 0.92311                8.434 4.816 0.00000 
RISK 140 0.61372               42.370 8.463 0.00000 
SIZE 140 0.98287                1.879 1.425 0.07709 
PRO 140 0.55994               48.269 8.757 0.00000 
Source: STATA 13 Outputs 
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 Table 3 shows the result of normality test using Shapiro-Wilk W test. 
As shown in table 3, the Shapiro Wilk test for all the variables show p-values 
less than 0.05. This indicate that at 5% level of significant, the residuals are 
not normally distributed. 
Table 4  
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Models Chi2 (1) Prob > Chi2 
FRQ1 18.06 0.0000 
FRQ2 34.39 0.0000 
Source: STATA 13 Outputs 
 
 As shown in table 4, the p-value for model FRQ1 and FRQ2 are 
significant meaning they are less than 0.05 which suggests that there is 
heteroscedasticity problem in their data set. Therefore the solution to the 
normality and heteroscedasticity problem is to use robust standard error in 
their regression analysis. 
Table 5  
Regression Result for the models 
Model  FRQ1   FRQ2  
Variable Coeff.   T P>t Coeff.    t P>t 
ACTE -.6147127  -1.52 0.130 -.0455446  -0.59 0.555 
LEVG 2.265968 23.76 0.000  .0334133   1.69 0.093 
RISK .1939147  1.10 0.314 -.0569332  -1.69 0.094 
SIZE -.0375272 -1.01 0.271 -.0238222  -2.78 0.006 
PRO .0000811  0.03 0.975  .0046041   9.24 0.000 
Cons .5894463  1.63 0.103  .2201757   2.77 0.007 
F(5, 121) = 635.49   =    20.10   
Prob >F = 0.0000   =  0.0000   
R2 = 0.9515   =  0.4537   
Adjusted R2  = 0.8716   =  0.3536   
Source: STATA 13 Outputs 
 
 Table 4 shows the regression results for the two models, the prob > F 
in the two cases is 0.0000, which suggest strong overall fitness of the two 
models. Also, R2 which shows the amount of variance in the dependent 
variables explained by the explanatory variables in the two cases are FRQ1 
(95%) and FRQ2 (45%). However, the adjusted R-square which is a better 
predictor of variations in the dependent variables since it takes care of the 
errors in the model shows FRQ1 (87%) and FRQ2 (35%).  
 Also table 5 shows that ACTE is negative and insignificant on FRQ1 
(β = -.6147127, t-value = -1.52, p-value = 0.130; negative and insignificant 
effect on FRQ2 (β = -.0455446, t-value = -0.59, p-value 0.555). Similarly, 
table 4 shows that LEVG has a positive and significant on FRQ1 (β = 
2.265968, t-value = 23.76, p-value 0.000; but positive and insignificant effect 
on FRQ2 (β = .0334133, t-value = 1.69, p-value = 0.093. Positive and 
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insignificant effect of RISK on FRQ1 (β = 1738616, t-value = 1.10, p-
value=0.314). Negative and insignificant effect on FRQ2 (β = -.0569332, t-
value = -1.69, p-value = 0.094). 
 Furthermore, negative and insignificant of SIZE on FRQ1 (β = -
.0375272, t-value = -1.01, p-value = 0.271), and negative and significant effect 
on FRQ2 (β = -.0238222, t-value = -2.78, p-value = 0.006). Positive and 
insignificant of PRO on FRQ1 (β = .0000811, t-value = 0.03, p-value = 0.975); 
positive and significant on FRQ2 (β = .0046041, t-value = 9.24, p-value = 
0.000). Also, the t-value test the hypothesis that the coefficient is different 
from 0. To reject this, there is need for a t-value of ± 0.95 at 0.05 confidence 
interval. In addition the two tail p-value tests the hypothesis that each 
coefficient is different from 0. To reject this the p-value has to be < 0.05. In 
view of the above results and the discussions that follows: 
 The null hypothesis which states that audit committee tenure has no 
significant effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit money banks 
in Nigeria (ACTE) is hereby accepted under FRQ1 and FRQ2 respectively. 
The constant (alpha) in the model means that if the independent variables 
(ACTE, LEVG, RISK, SIZE and PRO assume 0, on the average FRQ1 score 
will be .5894463; and FRQ2 score would be .2201757. the constant is simply 
where the regression line cross the axis the dependent variable axis the 
minimum score of audit committee tenure effectiveness. The result is 
inconsistent with Leong, Wang, Suwardy and Kusnadi (2015) and Ndubuisi 
and Ezechukwu (2017). The implication of these results is that the tenure of 
members of the audit committee is not important when considering the 
financial reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. It 
therefore suggests that individual banks may decide the tenure of their audit 
committee members. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 The study investigates the effect of audit committee tenure on financial 
reporting quality of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study 
concludes that audit committee tenure has an insignificant effect on financial 
reporting quality of listed DMBs. Also, leverage shows positive and 
significant effect on financial reporting quality. However, risk shows mixed 
results (positive and insignificant on FRQ1 and negative and significant on 
FRQ2). Firm size shows negative effect on financial reporting quality. PRO 
shows positive effect on financial reporting quality under the two models. 
Based on the conclusion, the study recommends that furthermore research 
should be done to examine other audit committee attributes that may influence 
financial reporting quality of listed DMBs in Nigeria. 
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